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W. Kip Viscusi
Pricing Lives for Corporate and Governmental
Risk Decisions1
Abstract: The value of a statistical life (VSL) is the most influential single param-
eter used in calculating the benefits of governmental regulations. While there are
some interagency differences, there is a commonality in the conceptual approach,
the central role of mortality risk valuation in benefit assessment, and the general
range of valuations used. Corporate risk decisions are based on a less rigorous
risk analysis procedure. As typified by the General Motors ignition switch recall
problems and the company’s lax corporate safety culture, there is often little sys-
tematic corporate balancing of cost and risk. This suppression of safety concerns
may be attributable to the adverse experiences automobile companies had after con-
ducting risk analyses that valued fatalities based on damages awards for wrongful
death, and in response juries levied blockbuster punitive damages awards. Instead,
companies should adopt the VSL in its product risk decisions. Companies should
also be provided with a safe harbor reference point for responsible risk decisions.
Regulatory agencies should use the VSL in setting regulatory sanctions.
Keywords: GM ignition switch; health; risk; safety; value of a statistical life; VSL.
JEL classifications: I10; I18; K32; J28; J17.
1 Expanding the role of benefit-cost analysis and
the value of a statistical life
The value of a statistical life (VSL) is the most influential economic parameter
used in the evaluation of governmental regulations. The necessity for valuing mor-
tality risks in benefit-cost analyses arises from the limitations in societal resources,
1 This article is based on the author’s presidential address at the Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis
conference, March 19, 2015. Glenn Blomquist and Bill Hoyt provided valuable suggestions.
W. Kip Viscusi: University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and
Management, Vanderbilt University, 131 21st Avenue South, Nashville, TN 37203, USA,
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coupled with substantial opportunities to promote health and safety both through
private decisions and government policy. Recently, mortality risk benefits have
comprised the preponderance of the benefits of all new major governmental regu-
lations, particularly due to the efforts of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).2 In this article, I review
the pivotal role that the VSL plays in government policies and examine how the
VSL could also serve a constructive function in corporate risk decisions adopting a
benefit-cost approach.
There is no conceptual barrier that limits the application of the VSL concept
to valuing outcomes resulting from government policy decisions. Most of the esti-
mates of the VSL in the economics literature are based on revealed preference stud-
ies of the risk–money trade-offs reflected in private decisions.3 In lieu of revealed
preference estimates, economists may attempt to create simulated market trade-offs
using stated preference methods, but the focus remains on individual preferences
for personal risks. Estimates of compensating differentials for workplace fatality
risks are the most common revealed preference studies, but researchers have also
estimated money–risk trade-offs implied by consumer choices such as seatbelt use,
the price–safety gradient for used cars, and the relationship of housing prices to
environmental hazards. These valuations consequently reflect the value that con-
sumers place on safety.
In this article, I begin with an overview of government practices with respect
to the use of VSL estimates. When did government agencies adopt this method-
ology, and how has it evolved during the course of its application to evaluating
government policies? My primary interest here is not to provide a comprehensive
assessment of government practices but to establish the basic dimensions of the use
of VSL estimates and to explore how corporate risk decisions might also profit by
incorporating the VSL methodology.
The principal case study that I use to explore the safety–cost trade-off made by
corporations is the 2014 General Motors (GM) ignition switch recall. The recall,
the subsequent penalties for failing to disclose the defect, and the examination of
the internal GM practices that gave rise to the defect raise fundamental issues with
respect to how corporations should undertake risk analyses for safety measures.
2 The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (2014), p. 14, made the following observation: “The
largest benefits are associated with regulations that reduce the risks to life . . . .” Table 1-1 of that report
documents the dominant role of EPA and DOT regulations in terms of both the benefits and costs of
regulatory policies.
3 See Viscusi (1992) for a review of both stated preference and revealed preference VSL studies and
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for a review of the revealed preference VSL literature. Viscusi (2014) reviews
government practices and provides a list of the VSL amounts used in about 100 regulatory impact
analyses.
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Previous discussions of this behavior by GM CEO Mary Barra, the internal review
commissioned by GM, and subsequent media coverage have not offered any expla-
nation for this conduct, apparently treating the GM safety culture as an inexplicable
random event. I suggest that GM’s lax safety culture is a consequence of the com-
pany’s response to being punished with extremely high punitive damages awards
in instances in which the company undertook a detailed safety study. Companies
should return to doing systematic risk analyses, and the valuation of the safety-
related fatalities in these analyses should be based on the VSL rather than on the
level of court awards from wrongful death cases. Even adopting a sound economic
methodology may, however, lead companies to continue to be vulnerable to puni-
tive damages awards so that greater legal protection for economic analyses would
be worthwhile.
Similarly, there are additional opportunities for government agencies to utilize
the VSL as the guiding parameter for health and safety policies. There is no need to
restrict the use of the VSL to prospective regulatory impact analyses. Government
agencies should also utilize VSL estimates to set appropriate sanctions for regu-
latory violations in situations where it is desirable to create efficient incentives to
reduce mortality risks.
2 Calculating and estimating the value of a
statistical life
The VSL terminology indicates that the value we are seeking is the value per unit
risk for small changes in risk levels. The meaning of the VSL can be illustrated
using a simple example. Suppose that there is a 1/10,000 fatality risk to 10,000
people. Consequently, there is one expected death that will occur to this group.
Assume that each person in the group would be willing to pay $900 to eliminate
the risk. Then collectively, it would be possible to raise $900 from each of the
10,000 exposed individuals to avert the random death, leading to a total amount of
$9 million to avert the one expected death. Viewed in value per unit risk terms gives
a valuation: $900/(1/10,000) = $9 million. This trade-off rate per expected death
serves as the VSL. For small changes in the risk level, the VSL should be the same
whether people are paying for small decreases in the risk or being compensated for
a small increase in the risk. This theoretical prediction is borne out in labor market
data.4
4 Kniesner, Viscusi and Ziliak (2014) estimated levels of VSL for workers who changed jobs in an
analysis that compared the VSL of workers whose new jobs led to an increase in job risk with the
VSL levels of workers who moved to safer jobs. There was no statistically significant difference in the
estimated VSL levels for these groups.
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The dominant approach to estimating the VSL utilizes evidence on wage–risk
trade-offs in the labor market. The underlying theory is not new, but dates back to
1776 with Adam Smith’s theory of compensating differentials: Workers demand
a premium for jobs that are unpleasant or pose additional risk. Testing the theory
successfully based on econometric evidence took two centuries. But there is now
a substantial economics literature that estimates the VSL from labor market deci-
sions. Controlling for other aspects of the job, how much pay do workers get for
incurring extra risk?
In some instances, the risks workers face are substantial. Fictional characters
such as Jack Bauer in the television antiterrorism series 24 represent extreme exam-
ples of risk. Coal miners and deep sea fisherman are nonfictional examples of work-
ers who incur relatively large risks. Although such dramatic risks are not the norm,
few workers’ jobs are risk-free. In my early studies of VSL using data from the
1970s, the average annual worker fatality rate from job-related risks was 1/10,000.
At present, the annual worker fatality risk averages about 1/25,000.
The trade-offs for facing risk are sometimes explicit. For example, elephant
handlers in the Philadelphia Zoo received an annual wage premium of $1,000
because elephants pose the greatest risk to zookeepers.5 Firefighters who bat-
tled the fires in Kuwait received $500,000 per year.6 More typically, workers
receive a modest premium for the relatively low risks that they face on the job.
The econometric task is to estimate this premium and to ascertain the wage–risk
trade-off. Analogously, one can also estimate the cost–risk trade-off from product
choices. The switch to smaller, more fuel efficient vehicles has killed thousands
of motorists, but in return for these greater risks consumers have reduced their
gas bills.7
The average VSL based on the revealed preferences in the labor market yields
a U.S. value of about $9 million. Thus, a worker facing a risk of death of 1/10,000,
as in our example above, requires $900 in extra pay per year to face this risk. For the
current average annual death risk of 1/25,000, the additional wage compensation
is $360. This figure is just an average amount across the labor market. The VSL
is not, however, a universal constant. There is substantial heterogeneity in the VSL
with workers in high risk jobs having a VSL far below $9 million and workers in
lower risk jobs having a VSL of $20 million or more.
5 Viscusi (1992), p. 8.
6 Ibid.
7 The DOT produced such an estimate of 1,300 deaths per year that was cited in Product Safety and
Liability Reporter, Vol. 18, No. 38, September 21, 1990, pp. 1054–1055. Crandall and Graham (1989)
provide an economic exploration of the relationship between mortality risks and fuel economy standards
for which they estimated that the fuel economy standards for the 1989 model year cars would lead to an
extra 2,200 to 3,900 fatalities over the next decade.
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A principal characteristic that drives differences in estimates of VSL is the
level of individual income. Safety is a normal good, and more affluent consumers
place a greater value on safety. Across the U.S. working population, the estimates
of the income elasticity range from 0.5 to over 1.0. Similarly, there are also income-
related differences in the VSL that appear in international evidence. Countries with
lower per capita income than the United States, such as India, have lower estimated
levels of VSL.8
The landmark event that led to the widespread adoption of the use of VSL
by government agencies can be traced to the debate over the hazard communica-
tion regulation proposed by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) in 1982.9 In its regulatory impact analysis, OSHA viewed the expected
lives saved as being too sacred to value. Instead, OSHA calculated the “cost of
death” associated with these prevented fatalities. The present value of lost earn-
ings and medical expenses served as the benefit value. Based on this analysis, the
benefits did not exceed the costs, and the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) rejected the proposed
regulation.
OSHA then appealed the decision to then Vice President Bush, leading to my
involvement in the policy debate. I was asked to prepare an analysis to resolve the
dispute between the two agencies, after being approved by OMB and the Secre-
tary of Labor. OMB’s critique of many of the components of the OSHA analysis
was compelling. However, even if one accepted all of the OMB assumptions, the
estimated benefits would exceed the costs if instead of valuing lives saved by the
cost of death one used the VSL. My VSL estimate at that time was $3 million (or
$7.4 million in current dollars), which exceeded OSHA’s cost of death value by an
order of magnitude. An analysis making this change generated benefits exceeding
the costs, and the Reagan administration approved the regulation, which was the
most ambitious regulatory proposal to date in that administration.
Subsequently, OSHA and other agencies began to adopt the VSL approach.
This methodology had a persuasive economic rationale in that agencies were now
able to value lives correctly. Although I would like to think that agencies were
swayed by economic reasoning, it is also likely that boosting the benefit estimates
by a factor of 10 enhanced the attractiveness of agency regulations, which no doubt
had substantial political appeal as well.
8 The estimated income elasticity of the VSL reported in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) ranged from 0.5
to 0.6. The median U.S. VSL based in their meta-analysis was $7 million in year 2000 dollars, while
the estimated VSL levels for studies utilizing data from India had a VSL range from $1.0 million to
$4.1 million, with a median value of about $1.4 million.
9 Viscusi (1992) provides more detailed discussion of the OMB–OSHA controversy and my economic
analysis.
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3 Policy-related methodological issues
The use of the VSL for benefit assessment raises a host of methodological issues,
but for the most part agencies have either resolved them or have made a policy deci-
sion regarding the agency approach. The reliance on revealed preference values or
stated preference values differs by country. In the United States, where many labor
market estimates have generated reliable estimates of the VSL, the primary, and in
some cases, the exclusive, emphasis of agency policies has been on revealed prefer-
ence data. In contrast, labor market estimates of the VSL have been more unstable
in the United Kingdom. As a result, the policy focus in the United Kingdom is on
stated preference values of the VSL, particularly on transportation-related values
elicited using various survey techniques.10
Which studies the agency relies upon in setting its VSL varies across agencies.
At one extreme, the agency may rely on a single best estimate from a reliable labor
market study, as in the case of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. An
intermediate case is the U.S. Department of Transportation (2014), which derives
its current VSL of $9.2 million relying on an average of the estimates from labor
market studies using the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) data, which
is the current gold standard in occupational fatality data.11 The EPA has a long
history of interest in VSL issues governed primarily by a series of meta-analyses,
which comprise primarily the revealed preference estimates but also may include
stated preference estimates.
The role of publication selection bias has been of increasing concern in the
literature and is a topic I examine in Viscusi (2015b). Fortunately, the VSL esti-
mates currently used for policy assessment purposes are in the appropriate range
even after adjusting for publication selection effects, which are statistically signifi-
cant. Selection effects may influence the VSL estimates that researchers submit to
journals and the VSL estimates that journals are willing to publish. An additional
potential selection bias can arise with respect to agencies’ choice of estimates of the
VSL to be used in assessing the appropriate levels of the VSL for policy purposes.
While there is evidence of significant publication selection biases in the literature,
my selection-corrected estimates of the VSL are similar to the values currently used
by regulatory agencies.
10 The survey studies by Jones-Lee (1989) and his various collaborators examine money–risk trade-off
rates for transportation safety risks.
11 In Viscusi (2013), I review the properties of the CFOI data and the capabilities that these data provide
for economic analysis. The CFOI data are based on a comprehensive census of all work-related injuries
rather than a sample of fatalities, where all deaths and their job relatedness must be verified using
multiple sources such as death certificates and workers’ compensation records.
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To what extent can labor market estimates of the VSL be used to capture the
appropriate VSL for risks outside the labor market? This issue, which is known
as benefits transfer, is often acknowledged but seldom examined. Both the U.S.
Office of Management and Budget (2003) guidance and the U.K. H. M. Treasury
Green Book (2011) highlight the potential importance of benefits transfer issues
with respect to VSL. The role of benefits transfer has arisen with particular promi-
nence with respect to cancer, for which the mortality risks may be accompanied by
a substantial morbidity component. The EPA and the United Kingdom both have
adopted a cancer premium, though the extent of the premium and its justification
based on economic studies remain matters of continuing concern.12 Less dramatic
benefits transfer issues arise with respect to the application of the VSL estimates
from labor market risks to mortality risks outside the labor market from trans-
portation activities, products, and environmental exposures. Many agencies, such
as DOT, use the labor market estimates of VSL to assess the benefits of mortality
risk reductions from causes other than job accidents. Viscusi and Gentry (2015)
provide evidence in support of the appropriateness of using labor market estimates
of the VSL for transportation-related deaths that occur outside of workplace set-
tings. Job-related deaths and transportation-related deaths both involve traumatic
injuries. Motor-vehicle-related deaths comprise a large component of job-related
fatalities. The estimated VSL levels for motor-vehicle deaths are similar to the esti-
mated VSL levels for fatalities unrelated to motor vehicles, as well as to overall
labor market VSL estimates.
Much of the focus of the recent economics literature has been on estimates
of the heterogeneity of VSL with different personal characteristics, such as age.
Efforts to incorporate this heterogeneity in policy evaluations have not been suc-
cessful. The EPA performed a sensitivity analysis of its Clear Skies initiative using
an age-adjusted VSL that reduced the VSL for fatalities to those over age 65 by 37%
using results from stated preference research in the United Kingdom. The public
outcry over the use of a “senior discount” led to the abandonment of this exploratory
effort.
My interest in age-related variations has continued for several decades and has
been enhanced by the availability of more refined fatality statistics.13 From an eco-
nomic standpoint, the VSL is the risk–money trade-off, and this amount may remain
12 The U.S. EPA has adopted a provisional cancer premium of 50%, whereas in the United Kingdom
the cancer premium entails using a VSL that is double that for accidental deaths. The U.K. guidance pro-
vides no supporting evidence for this premium. Viscusi, Huber and Bell (2014) review these approaches
and present new evidence of a more modest cancer premium of about 21%.
13 Viscusi (2013) reviews the capabilities of the new fatality risk data, and Viscusi (2014) examines
the empirical evidence regarding these and other aspects of the heterogeneity of VSL. Aldy and Viscusi
(2007) provide a detailed assessment of labor market evidence with respect to age variations in VSL.
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quite high over the life cycle. I noticed that my son drove a topless Jeep Wrangler
while I drove a car with a full roster of safety devices. It did not seem reasonable
that my VSL should be substantially lower than his. Also I had not noticed senior
citizens engaging in the risky behaviors one would expect if they had a low VSL.
As it turns out, the VSL does follow the life-cycle income trajectory and has an
inverted U shape. However, the VSL does not plummet as one ages, but tapers off
so that the VSL of a 65 year old is higher than that of an 18 year old. It is also note-
worthy that because of the pattern of VSL over the life cycle, using labor market
estimates of the age variations in VSL for the Clear Skies initiative yields benefit
estimates similar to those obtained without any age adjustment.
Government agencies currently use the VSL approach based on similar eco-
nomic rationales and have abandoned the human capital, or cost of death, approach.
Both in government as well as in economics research circles, the controversy over
the use of VSL is substantially muted. Agencies also have converged to using fairly
similar monetary values. Whether the estimates are derived from labor market stud-
ies or stated preference studies, agencies generally use an average VSL for the pop-
ulation rather than incorporating the heterogeneity of VSL.
While valuing mortality risks is a standard operating procedure for govern-
ment agencies, the use of VSL in business decisions is less well established. On a
conceptual basis, there is no reason that the VSL should not generalize to corporate
risk decisions. Indeed, the VSL figures derived from revealed preferences in market
decisions would seem to be ideally suited to safety policies of business.
4 GM ignition switch recall overview14
In 2014, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) fined GM
$35 million for failing to report a defect in the ignition switch for several vehicle
lines. GM had done a recall analysis in 2007, but there is no evidence that they did
a full blown benefit-cost analysis. Here I will explore various aspects of the GM
ignition switch controversy. How should GM have handled the defect? Why did
GM ignore the problem? How can regulatory policy and liability rules be restruc-
tured to foster more responsible corporate behavior? Finally, does the VSL have a
constructive role to play in corporate risk decisions?
The nature of the ignition switch failure is that while the vehicle is moving,
the switch might accidentally turn off the vehicle. Although there was some initial
speculation on the part of GM that the failure might be due to the driver putting
14 Viscusi (2015a) provides documentation with respect to the factual issues in much of the discussion
below.
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items on the chain connected to the key fob, the defect ultimately was not traced
to the role of such extra weight. At the time of the 2014 NHTSA penalties of GM,
the company’s estimate of the number of fatalities attributable to the defect was
13 deaths. By the March, 2015 date of the Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis confer-
ence, the official death toll announced by GM had risen to 64 deaths. The estimates
of the number of deaths attributable to the defect have continued to rise and now
stand at 124 fatalities. In addition, hundreds of people were injured by the defect,
and there was substantial property damage as well.
Regulatory action by NHTSA brought the ignition switch problem into promi-
nence. Although the ignition switch problem was not new, GM never disclosed the
defect to NHTSA. Last year, NHTSA fined GM $35 million for not reporting the
ignition switch defect. Although GM had not reported the defect to NHTSA, the
defect problem was the subject of internal analyses. My main theme is that GM and
other companies should undertake benefit-cost analyses of safety-related decisions
in much the same manner as do government agencies.
When GM CEO Mary Barra testified at the congressional hearing, she dis-
played an example of the problematic ignition switch. Although she was informa-
tive about the nature of the mechanical problems, her discussion of the defect did
not illuminate much about the process that led GM to continue to market cars with
a defective switch or GM’s failure to do a proper recall. She indicated that GM
had done a recall assessment for which they assumed the cost was about $100 mil-
lion back in 2007. She did not indicate the estimate of any adverse effects that
would have been prevented. Suppose that for purposes of illustration we use the
124 fatality estimate that GM now attributes to the defective switch, and set aside
the nonfatal injuries and property damage for purposes of this calculation. What
would the estimated benefits have been? If you take the current VSL estimate used
by DOT of a $9.2 million VSL and multiply it by 124 deaths, the estimated bene-
fits equal $1.141 billion. Alternatively, if you take my meta-analysis VSL number
with Joseph Aldy of $7 million (year 2000 dollars), which understates the inflation-
corrected VSL level at the time of the recall decision, then the mortality risk benefit
of doing the recall is $868 million. In each case, the mortality risk reduction ben-
efit exceeds the $100 million cost estimate, so it easily passes the benefit-cost test.
Moreover, as I indicate below, the use of the VSL to value mortality risks associ-
ated with defects may be greater than that for vehicle design changes for additional
safety features. On benefit-cost grounds wholly apart from their legal obligations,
GM should have done the recall. What is particularly striking is that GM did not do
any such analysis. While there apparently was at least an attempt to develop a rough
estimate of the cost of a recall, there is no evidence that any employees sought to
assess the safety benefits of a recall.
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The inattention to safety-related matters at GM was a consistent theme of an
analysis of the decisions that led to the GM ignition switch problems. General
Motors commissioned an investigative study in 2014 known as the Valukas Report
(Valukas, 2014) to examine the corporate decisions that led to the ignition switch
problem and the failure to institute a prompt recall of the defective product. This
striking report provided an in-depth examination of the corporate safety culture at
GM, which is actually fairly bizarre.
In an effort to head off legal and regulatory controversies, GM had established
a list of forbidden words that GM employees are supposed to not ever use. These
included, among others: bad, critical, dangerous, defect, failure, problem, safety,
serious, and unstable. General Motors memos and reports are never to include
such language. Less surprising is that more inflammatory words are also prohib-
ited. These words struck me as being potentially more controversial: apocalyptic,
catastrophic, death trap, decapitating, evil, ghastly, inferno, terrifying, and “You’re
toast!” Along the same lines, GM memos instructed company drivers of GM vehi-
cles to never make comments about the vehicles such as the following: “This is a
safety and security issue,” “Dangerous; almost caused an accident,” “This is a very
dangerous thing to happen,” and “This is a lawsuit waiting to happen.”
The GM safety culture extended beyond the prohibition of specific language.
It also included behaviors designed to deflect proper attention away from respon-
sible safety practices. One such behavior is known as the GM nod. This practice
was so pervasive that GM CEO Mary Barra highlighted the role of the GM nod in
discussions summarized in the Valukas Report. The GM nod involved people at a
meeting nodding in agreement that yes, safety is a good thing and that it would be
appropriate to undertake the safety measure. However, with that nod there is also
an implicit agreement that nobody is really going to do anything to implement this
initiative.
A companion behavior is known as the GM salute. Consider a meeting environ-
ment in which the participants reached an agreement about an appropriate safety-
related measure. At the time of this agreement, the participants cross their hands
and point to the people on each side of them. The responsibility lies with them; it
is not your responsibility to do anything. The result is that the participants reached
a consensus on the desirability of the safety effort, but they also shared a lack of
commitment to taking any concrete action.
The Valukas Report did not offer any speculations as to how the corporate
safety culture developed at GM. There was a combination of suppression of frank
safety-related discussion coupled with a concerted effort to avoid responsibility for
safety-related measures. Is the lack of any responsible safety culture a historical
accident? What influences led GM to develop these practices? Is it likely that this
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behavior is only a characteristic of GM or is it probable that other companies dis-
play a similar inattention to safety?
The reluctance to undertake benefit-cost analyses and the suppression of frank
discussion of safety matters may be attributable to the unfavorable history that auto-
mobile companies have had with respect to risk analyses. Many auto companies
have undertaken systematic assessments of costs and risk not unlike a rudimentary
form of benefit-cost analysis. The result is that the companies became exposed to
substantial legal penalties in terms of punitive damages awards for defective prod-
ucts. The emphasis on avoiding language and other written documents that could
contribute to the firm’s liability exposure is consistent with the likely impact of past
legal sanctions.
A prominent starting point for considering the potentially costly ramifications
of risk analysis is the tort liability case involving the Ford Pinto, Grimshaw v. Ford
Motor Co. This entry level vehicle had a shortcoming in that if you are driving a
Ford Pinto and somebody hits your car from the rear, there is a good chance the
car will have a fire, leading to potential burn injuries and possibly death. Ford was
aware of the fire-related risk from the gas tank placement and had done a benefit-
cost analysis of the desirability of moving the gas tank so that there would not be a
fire upon rear impact. The Ford analysis used $200,000, the average court award for
wrongful death cases at that time, as the benefit value for preventing each expected
death. The Ford analysis concluded that the cost of $137.5 million exceeded the
benefits, so the company did not move the gas tank. Thus, the company was aware
of a potential safety-related issue and the cost to address it, but chose not to move
the tank since the benefits did not exceed the costs, in their view. One plaintiff’s
attorney called it the most remarkable document ever produced in an American
lawsuit.
While the ex ante perspective of a risk analysis showed that costs exceeded
benefits, in the ex post perspective of litigation the comparison is quite different.
From the standpoint of the jury, the case is a no-brainer: the jury sees that somebody
died (and actually in this case somebody else was also catastrophically injured),
and on the other hand there is the $11 cost for Ford to change the design of the
car by moving the gas tank. So with a comparison of an identified death with $11,
the ex post litigation calculus is clear-cut. The company is going to lose. The jury
not only found Ford liable for the death, but also levied a $125 million punitive
damages award to punish Ford for its behavior.
Such punitive awards in excess of $100 million are rare, and in a series of
articles I have termed them “blockbuster punitive damages awards.” I have been
able to identify over 100 of these blockbuster awards to date. Ten of these awards
are related to automobiles. Particularly striking is that most of these auto-related
blockbuster awards have been triggered by the company doing a risk analysis.
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Ford encountered similar legal controversies with respect to a risk analysis that
did not deal with gas tank fire risks in Miles v. Ford Motor Co. Ford suffered legal
penalties related to injuries associated with a tension eliminator for the shoulder
harness on the seatbelt. What was Ford’s transgression? Ford would first run what
was characterized as “a cost-benefit analysis” to see what the cost would be to fix
or repair the defect. This type of procedure starts to sound like some of the things
a lot of economist members of the Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis generally do,
though the specifics of the analysis would be different. As part of its analysis, Ford’s
apparent transgression is that it would assign arbitrary values to each death or seri-
ous injury and would predict the number of occurrences that would involve either
death or serious injury. At an abstract level, this effort seems remarkably similar
to standard benefit assessment practices. In the final step of this calculation, Ford
would determine the cost to litigate such deaths and serious injuries and use this
value to monetize the benefits. This approach is a departure from current economic
norms, but was not uncommon in the era before agencies adopted the VSL method-
ology. If the cost to repair the defect exceeded the other costs, then Ford would not
correct the design problem.
The adverse experiences with risk analyses were not limited to Ford. Chrysler
undertook similar risk assessments and in one case, Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp., was
hit with a $250 million punitive damages award. What did Chrysler do that was
so reprehensible? According to the quotes from jurors, “Chrysler officials at the
highest level cold-bloodedly calculated that acknowledging the problem and fixing
it would be more expensive in term of bad publicity and lost sales than conceal-
ing the defect and litigating the wrongful death suits that inevitably would result.”
However, such calculations would be a routine part of any benefit-cost analysis
that would be a responsible approach provided that the company also valued the
mortality risk reductions properly.
As one might expect from the ingrained lax safety culture at GM, General
Motors has not been restricted to the role of spectator viewing other companies
being penalized for risk assessments. General Motors has had a particularly promi-
nent role in terms of these lawsuits and blockbuster punitive damages awards. As
with Ford and its experience with the Pinto, GM has also had fuel-fed fire impact
cases. General Motors engineer, Edward Ivey, applied his engineering training to
undertake a benefit-cost analysis of moving the fuel tank.15 Similar to the Ford
analysis approach, he did a benefit-cost analysis using $200,000 per fatality based
on the wrongful death awards and concluded the costs exceeded the benefits. As a
result, the company did not alter the placement of the tank.
15 See the Memorandum from E. C. Ivey, Value Analysis of Auto Fuel Fed Fire Related Fatalities,
General Motors, June 29, 1973.
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The juror comments in a prominent case involving this analysis and gas tank
risks, Moseley v. General Motors, indicate how such analyses will be interpreted in
the ex post venue of judicial proceedings. In the post-trial discussions, the jurors
indicated that because GM officials had done the analysis, the company knew there
was a risk. That they knew of the risk was the constant refrain among the jurors
who were interviewed. The jury awarded $101 million in punitive damages. When
asked why the jury picked a number such as $101 million, the jurors indicated that
they included $1 million as an exclamation point. From my vantage point, I think
$100 million would have gotten their attention regardless of the exclamation point
bonus.
Similar rear impact risks were the focus of a GM Chevrolet Malibu case, Ander-
son v. General Motors. The burn injuries arose after a Chevrolet Malibu was rear-
ended on Christmas Eve – timing that may have boosted the jury award. The jury
awarded $107.8 million in compensatory damages and $4.8 billion in punitive dam-
ages. These awards were for nonfatal burn injuries, not deaths. General Motors’s
risk analysis once again played a pivotal role. Jurors told reporters that they thought
the company valued life too lightly. However, it is not clear that the jurors would
have been happy with any benefit-cost trade-off. The jurors seemed to express a
zero-risk mentality. One juror said that there was no evidence that the car they put
out there was as safe as the car they could have put out there. This final quote epito-
mizes the juror’s views: “We’re just like numbers, I feel, to them. Statistics. That’s
something that is wrong.” Interestingly, one could make that same comment about
most regulatory impact analyses for governmental regulations involving mortality
risk.
In addition to being the target of criticism for its rear impact fire analyses, GM
also came under attack for its door latch analysis. In this case, Hardy v. General
Motors, the jury levied another $100 million punitive damages award. The legal
risk the companies face is that if the company performs a benefit-cost analysis or a
risk analysis of any sort, that exercise shows awareness of the risk. Such awareness
of the risk is one of the standard triggers in jury instructions for awarding punitive
damages. In effect, doing the analysis demonstrates that the company was aware of
the risk and proceeded to put the hazardous product in the market anyway.
5 Experimental evidence on responsible risk
analyses
Is it possible to undertake sound risk management efforts and avoid the pitfalls
exemplified in these cases? For all of these past efforts in which there have been
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attempts to monetize the safety benefits, the unit benefit value has been a human
capital measure linked to compensation measures in wrongful death cases rather
than the VSL. It would be useful to explore how companies would fare if they
undertook a more meaningful benefit-cost analysis. Instead of using as the benefit
measure the present value of lost earnings for whoever is being killed, what if the
company used the $9 million figure adopted by DOT or some other VSL number
widely used by government agencies? Adopting a benefit-cost analysis approach
utilizing the VSL has a sound economic rationale, will include a much larger fatality
rate benefit measure than the human capital, or cost of death approach, and would
be consistent with standard government practices.
To explore the reactions of prospective jurors to this approach, I developed a
series of hypothetical case scenarios that I presented to a sample of almost 700 adult
jury-eligible citizens.16 Interestingly, even if the company uses the VSL number in
its analysis, there is still substantial support for a punitive damages award. What
is particularly disturbing is that when the mock jurors are setting the value of the
award, they seek to “send the company a message” by picking a punitive damages
amount greater than the VSL figure used by the company. As a result, the higher
the number used by the company, the higher will be the punitive damages award the
juries wanted to levy. So if the company values life at $1 million, a juror can send
the company a message with an award of $2 million. But if the company values life
at $7 million, in order to send the company a message, the juror would have to levy
a larger punitive damages award such as $10 million.
This counterproductive effect of valuing lives more highly, and in effect plac-
ing a greater weight on safety, poses inherent difficulties for any company seeking
to undertake a sound risk analysis. The difficulty arises because unlike regulatory
agencies, courts act ex post, after people are injured. And the comparison is conse-
quently between an identified life and the per-product safety cost. Because of the
substantial influence of hindsight bias in such situations, there are practical imped-
iments to framing the decision as a prospective corporate risk decision, which is
what is essential for jurors to have a proper vantage point.
Fostering responsible corporate risk management through the use of benefit-
cost analysis is highly desirable, but faces considerable practical obstacles. The
task of getting companies to adopt the benefit-cost analysis approach is much more
challenging than the task facing government agencies because of the pending liabil-
ity risks and the retrospective nature of jury deliberations. Current jury instructions
16 The principal wave of these mock juror evaluations was the sample of 489 reported in Viscusi (2000),
with the remainder of 197 mock jurors being included in responses to different scenarios in Viscusi
(2002).
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that include awareness of the safety hazards as a standard component of criteria for
punitive damages do not foster efforts by companies to grapple with risk issues in
a meaningful way.
6 Policy remedies to promote corporate
benefit-cost analyses
Suggesting that corporations base their safety policies on benefit-cost analyses
using VSL statistics is not akin to asking them to abandon their corporate function
and to behave as a government agency. The VSL estimates reflect the risk–money
trade-offs of their customers, play a central role in consumer choices, and should
have a pivotal role in design decisions with respect to auto safety (Blomquist, 1988).
The implicit VSL embodied in private choices with respect to transportation
risks was first established in the VSL literature with respect to consumers’ use
of safety equipment. Studies of the use of seatbelts beginning with Blomquist
(1979) imputed the VSL based on the monetary value of the time and effort cost
of buckling that consumers incur in return for the reduced risk levels. Other pro-
tective equipment often involves an explicit monetary cost, but the time cost con-
tinues to loom particularly large, given the frequency with which the consumer
must undertake the precaution. Based on an extension of the general approach
in the seatbelt analyses, Blomquist, Miller and Levy (1996) estimated the VSL
associated with motorcycle helmets as well as the risks based on the use of child
safety seats for children, for whom they find comparatively higher values. Given the
expected safety benefits of protective equipment, are people irrational if they fail
to take advantage of these protective measures? Whether that is the case depends
on whether the safety measure passes a private benefit-cost test. Just as the bene-
fits of safer vehicle design features for motor vehicles may not pass a benefit-cost
test, Blomquist (1991) found that those consumers who forego some precautionary
opportunities may do so for quite rational reasons, such as a higher value of time.
Similarly, respondents who indicate a higher VSL in stated preference surveys are
more likely to use seatbelts (Hakes & Viscusi, 2007) so that decisions to engage in
safety-related behaviors are consistent with their levels of VSL.
The wage premium required to get workers to accept risky jobs has a product
market counterpart, as consumers will be willing to pay more for safer cars. Sev-
eral studies have examined how the product price varies with safety. For example,
Dreyfus and Viscusi (1995) find that used cars with a better safety record com-
mand a higher price, controlling for other automobile characteristics. More recently,
Rohlfs, Sullivan and Kniesner (2015) have shown that the price premium for cars
equipped with air bags yields a VSL estimate very similar to the estimates used for
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government policy. In effect, basing corporate decisions on a benefit-cost analysis
using a VSL will replicate the decisions that would emerge if consumers were fully
informed of the vehicle safety levels and had the opportunity to pay a higher price
for safer cars.
Despite the fundamental linkage to consumer preferences, jurors may never-
theless be unsympathetic to such analyses, given the retrospective nature of jury
proceedings. To overcome these challenges, I suggest the following solution. First,
companies should undertake systematic benefit-cost assessments of safety mea-
sures just as do government agencies. Second, in doing these analyses companies
should value the lives saved using VSL estimates rather than the values based on
wrongful death cases. Third, we should establish government practices for benefit-
cost analyses as a safe harbor reference point. If a safety feature fails a benefit-cost
test, so that not adopting it is efficient, then the company also is not negligent. In
such situations I would prohibit introduction of the analysis by the plaintiff. The
plaintiffs would not be able to introduce as evidence information indicating that the
company had done a benefit-cost analysis or the results of this analysis. If, how-
ever, the safety measure passes a benefit-cost test and the company decides to not
implement the safety measure anyway, then there would be no legal protection for
the analysis.
Policy reform also includes a meaningful role for the VSL in terms of the reg-
ulatory sanctions. NHTSA penalties are currently capped at $7,000 per violation,
with a limit of $35 million total penalties for a related series of violations. These are
trivial amounts. The appropriate deterrence value for known risks is the VSL. So
at $9.2 million a life and 124 people killed, the amount of money you would need
to generate the appropriate incentives is $1.141 billion. Rather than using $7,000
per violation, NHTSA should use the VSL to set the penalty level in the case of
fatalities, boosting the scale of penalties by three orders of magnitude. Changing
the penalty structure in this way would require a change in the agency’s legislation.
Creating efficient levels of deterrence becomes more complicated and requires
larger sanctions if the probability of detecting the wrongful conduct is below 1.0.
If there is only a 50% chance that the company’s transgressions will be identified,
then it is possible to create optimal levels of deterrence for the risk of a fatality by
setting the award equal to twice the VSL. More generally, it is possible to create
efficient deterrence by setting the total damages equal to the VSL divided by the
probability of detection.
While this approach is sound economics and can be traced back to Jeremy
Bentham, assessing the probability of detection is often difficult. In the case of
GM’s ignition switch problem, the probability of detection is less than 1, because
the company withheld the information from NHTSA for seven years and had
confidential settlements with the parties who sued them. GM clearly tried to reduce
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the likelihood of being discovered. Unfortunately, ex post, the probability of detec-
tion after learning about the risk is always 1.0. Fine-tuning optimal deterrence by
incorporating the probability of detection is likely to remain beyond jurors’ incli-
nations or capabilities. But at the very least, the VSL can assume a central role in
setting punitive awards and regulatory sanctions.
A final caveat is that the use of average VSL figures may understate the VSL
associated with safety defects as opposed to safety improvements. The application
of benefit-cost analysis to design changes for components of a vehicle that is volun-
tarily purchased may entail a different valuation of the risks than when benefit-cost
analysis is applied to a design defect that purchasers had no reason to anticipate.
While on a theoretical basis, small changes in risk in either direction should be val-
ued equally, when asked in a stated preference survey most people would require a
substantial price discount if they were told that 124 people who buy this car model
will die because of some safety defect. If you are told about this risk, you might
wonder what else is wrong with this car. That there is a substantial market response
to such product defects is well established. Several articles have documented the
adverse effect of product recalls on the wealth of sellers, where this measure cap-
tures both consumer demand effects as well as liability costs.17 Moreover, there is
also a demonstrable impact of product recalls on the consumer demand component
of the impact of recalls. Crafton, Hoffer and Reilly (1981) found that recalls of the
Ford Pinto and other models depressed sales of the defective models and boosted
the sales of substitutes. Subsequent studies by Reilly and Hoffer (1983) and Hof-
fer, Pruitt and Reilly (1992) have found that consumers use the recall information
as an input to their purchase decisions. The effect of a recall on the perceived risk
of the product may have a general effect in undermining consumer confidence in
the product. So the substantial amount that consumers must be compensated to be
indifferent to an identified product defect is not just a question of a discrepancy
between willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept values. The prospect of buy-
ing a defective car may be influenced by how the defect affects one’s product risk
assessment more generally.
There is also the complication that while the VSL is an average population
figure, there is substantial heterogeneity in the VSL level across the population.
Market choices enable people to match product riskiness to their preferences. Some
consumers may be particularly averse to incurring product risks because of their
high VSL. Risks associated with defects are unanticipated. If the consumer learns
about the risk after buying the product, then there is no opportunity to align the
level of safety with the consumer’s preferences other than by not using the product.
17 Examples of such analyses include Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), Hoffer, Pruitt and Reilly (1988),
and Gokhale, Brooks and Tremblay (2014).
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7 Conclusion
Much of the controversy over the past three decades with respect to the use of the
VSL to value mortality benefits has stemmed from a misunderstanding of what
the economic value of mortality benefits actually is. When I first generated VSL
estimates in the 1970s, there were critics at each end of the valuation spectrum.
On the one hand, people would argue that the VSL number should be infinite so
that the government should place an infinite value on risks to lives. At the other
extreme, some people argue that the multimillion dollar numbers are way too high
because they exceed the present value of lost earnings. Following this logic, how
could lives be worth more than what people earned? I believe the current economic
approach strikes a reasonable middle ground between infinity and lifetime earnings,
with current VSL estimates based on consumer preferences being in the vicinity of
$9 million.
A recurring lesson for public and private decisions is that monetizing benefits
makes them matter. So if we start leaving these numbers out of the analysis because
lives are too sacred to value, we will be back in the pre-VSL era and lives will be
less highly valued than they are now. The use of VSL in benefit-cost practices is
well established for government agencies. The remaining challenge is to promote
the use of benefit-cost analysis in corporate risk management decisions. While gov-
ernment agencies had to deal with philosophical debates about the valuations of
mortality risks, the challenges facing companies are much greater. Companies are
operating in a different legal environment in which their decisions are assessed ret-
rospectively. Companies will be penalized for a flawed analysis to a much greater
degree than regulatory agencies. Ideally, we should give companies greater legal
protection for risk analyses and encourage them to undertake responsible corporate
risk analysis.
The pivotal number for fostering responsible risk management decisions is the
VSL. The VSL is already the most influential single parameter driving governmen-
tal risk and environmental policies. It should also be the key parameter for com-
panies’ risk decisions and for setting legal and regulatory sanctions for contexts
involving fatality risks.
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